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QRA schemes remains a quite difficult and complex task to perform. Even worse is the assessment of Organi-
sational Reliability Assessment (ORA). The reasons of this difficulty mainly lay on the absence of a generical-
ly accepted paradigm that enables engineers to include systematically H&OF (Human & Organisational Fac-
tors) into the analysis. Broadly speaking, engineering approaches very often account for Error of Omission 
(EOO) forgetting the Errors of Commission (EOC), and, on top of that, they do not make any macro distinc-
tion between pre- and post-initiating human failures. This paper offers a paradigm on how to integrate H&OF 
into safety analysis by means of the Recursive Operability Analysis (ROA), which has been adapted to ac-
commodate H&OF, and renamed Integrated Recursive Operability Analysis (IROA). By means of a practical 
example, the method will illustrate how to account for H&OF in a systematic and consistent manner using an 
engineering approach. The paper will even provide a paradigm for the construction of Integrated Fault Trees 
(IFT) consistent with the IROA framework. 
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 1 INTRODUCTION 
Incorporating Human Factors (HF) into safety analyses is a rather difficult and complex exercise. Indeed, en-
gineers still find it difficult both to incorporating Human & Organisational (H&O) sources of risk into their 
daily analyses and to realistically quantify them. This is witnessed by the diffused practice of taking them into 
account only at a later stage of the analysis, when the human contribution, often reflecting only the contribu-
tion of sharp-end operators to the risk, is accounted for and analyzed vis-à-vis the dreamt accidental scenario. 
In practice, this means that a Human Reliability Assessment (HRA) is not performed and integrated into the 
safety analysis in a systematic and consistent manner but it is simply an added-on piece of information ac-
commodated ex-post into the analysis.  
Aim of this paper is to provide an improved methodological framework, with respect to that already proposed 
by S. Colombo et al. [1], that can ease the way in which safety analysts may account for H&OF since the early 
stages of their analyses. The present work builds on the conceptual scheme of the Recursive Operability Anal-
ysis (ROA) [2][3][4]; the step forward of the well known HAZOP [5][6][7][8].  
The reason to grounding the work of the Human Failure Identification (HFI), within the broader HRA scheme, 
on the ROA framework, relates to the three positives aspects this technique holds compared to its predecessor. 
The first one is the easiness with which logic trees can be directly derived once the ROA is completed. It is a 
“virtually automatic transition to the quantification stage” [4]. The second advantage relates to the conceptual 
and numerical accuracy with which the analyses are performed [9, 10]. Actually, the ROA scheme, by rule, 
imposes the use of the inhibit logic gate (INH) which, despite its conceptual correctness [9], is not much used 
in the daily practice as often substituted by the “and” logic gate (AND). The third not negligible aspect, which 
makes the ROA a powerful technique, relates to the possibility of easily making conceptual cross checks 
throughout the analysis, thus allowing congruence verification between the ROA and the subsequent Fault 
Trees and Event Trees. This task is very hard to perform whether a classical operability analysis, applying the 
tedious and sometime misleading guide words, is used. These capabilities of the ROA and its versatility to 
modelling very complex situations are described in a number of papers [4][11][12][13]. 
In the present work, the ROA procedure is modified in order to allow for H&OF being directly and systemati-
cally taken into account during the Operability Analysis; this additional “virtue” enables to identifying explic-
itly the need for interfaces with the HRA. 
2 RECURSIVE OPERABILITY ANALYSIS 
The classical ROA is performed by means of a clearly structured framework which, if systematically filled in 
according to plant’s streams and nodes, drives the analyst to unveil all potential hazards associated with the 
specific plant at hand.  
The execution of an ROA may be heavily dependent on the proper division of a plant: boxes A, B, C and W in 
the flow diagram (Fig. 1) are dedicated to a check for this purpose. Another preliminary operation is the iden-
tification of the boundary nodes and those internal to each sub-system - Box D, i.e. the points where devia-
tions of a process variable (temperature, pressure, etc.) may develop or propagate.  These points must be suit-
ably numbered.  This operation must naturally go hand in hand with the identification of the process variables 
regarded as significant for the analysis-Box E. 
 The OA itself actually begins at box F. The details of the process from this box onwards will now be de-
scribed. 
 Box F- A plant is usually analysed according to its flow lines.  It is thus advisable to take a boundary 
node of the first sub-system as the starting point. Box G-The first process variable chosen to start the anal-
ysis is selected.  
Its significant deviations from the stable operating conditions are examinedBox H- and then the protection 
(or shutdown) systems able to intervene-Box X. Box I-Identification of a 'Deviation' (column 1) is fol-
lowed by the search for all its 'Possible causes' (column 2).  
  
Fig. 1: Flow chart for the construction of a ROA. 
 
These causes are separated from each other by a dashed line if they are linked by an OR gate, and joined by 
the ampersand (symbol &) if they are linked by an AND gate. The 'Consequences' expected from the 'Devia-
tion' if the protection devices fail or are not present are placed in column (3). 
 Box J-At this point, having traced the origin of the causes, one investigates the gravity of the conse-
quences.  If one consequence is critical, i.e. appears as a Top Event (TE), it must be indicated in column (7) 
with a progressive number.  In any event, to be identified as a TE a consequence must be the outcome of devi-
ations for which protection systems have failed to come into action, or were not provided (Fig. 5). 
 Loop K-J-In the same way, if the first consequence is not a TE and hence conclusive for the analysis, it 
must be further analysed until either the consequence regarded as final is reached, or all the consequences re-
garded as possible and likely for the entire plant have been examined. 
 It will be seen, in fact, that each consequence is a deviation from the normal situation and, as such, can pro-
voke other more serious consequences (domino effect) that are identified as follows. 
 Box K-The intermediate consequence is now converted into a deviation by shifting column (3) to col-
umn (1) (                ) and its deviation is then automatically transformed into a cause by shifting column (1) to 
column (2) (               ): one or more new consequences are identified.   
The analysis is now continued by tracing back to the origin of the cause identified.  This is done by moving 
from one node to the next along the flow lines of the process, using simple logic rules applied to columns (1), 
(2) and (3). 
Box L-If the causes identified in box I are regarded as primary at the depth of analysis obtainable at this 
level, they are given an appropriate distinguishing mark, such as an asterisk -Box N, if not, they require 
further analysis.  They are, in fact, other deviations from the normal operating conditions provoked by other 
causes that are identified as follows. 
Box M- Non-primary causes are further examined by regarding them as deviations.  The content of the 
item in column (2) is thus included in column (1) as well (             ) and since this 'Deviation' must have a 
'Consequence', column (1) must be shifted to column (3) (                ). In this way, new causes are identified. 
Loop M-L- Systematically one works up from a cause as a deviation to the causes regarded as primary with 
reference to the consequence identified in box I. It is worth noting that this development of the analysis auto-
matically leads to the boundary nodes, which means that the adjoining sub-system must be analysed. 
It should also be noted that combination of the two procedures Loop K-J and Loop M-L both ensures that the 
analysis is congruent and permits connection between branches in the subsequent logic tree development. 
Box 0- Completes the inquiry for all the process variables identified in box E.  
Box P-The analysis ends for all the nodes comprised in box D. 
Box Q-If no unwanted consequences due to spurious intervention of the protective systems emerge after 
following the flow lines, it is essential for these deviations to be analysed separately. Box X- Each time a 
deviation is noted in box I or in the course of Loop K-J and M-L, columns (4) and (5) must show: 
· the optical and acoustical devices installed to give warning of the deviation, 
· the automatic protective or shutdown means provided for each deviation. 
Box Y- Moreover, a completeness check to ensure that all the nodes identified and their process variables 
have been duly analysed should be made at this stage by scanning the head of each form.  Following the col-
umn (1), (2) and (3) shifts for each deviation, cause and consequence must also carry out an OA congruence 
check. 
Box Z-The analysis ends with the identification of all TE's. 
In the example detailed in [2], a chef’s assistant of a busy restaurant, is in charge to timely producing crispy 
and dry French fries while assisting the chef in preparing more complicated dishes (a classical batch process). 
The process plant used by the assistant for this goal is that of Fig. 2.  
 
Fig. 2: Layout of the plant (1 Deep-Fryer, 2 Oil, 3 Thermostat, 4 High T cut off switch, 5 Smoke detector, 6 
Sprinkler) as reported in [2] 
 
The ROA application brings to the results in Figure 3. 
 
 
 
Fig. 3: ROA framework as reported in [2] 
 
3 INTEGRATED RECURSIVE OPERABILITY ANALYSIS (IROA) 
To facilitate the understanding of the IROA it was decided to extend the example made in reference [2] and 
above described. In this revised version, the first level of protection, i.e., the apparatus 4 in the plant’s layout, 
is made up of two components, namely (1) the high temperature LED and (2) the switch.  
The assistant starts preheating the oil so to be ready when chips are to be timely produced to garnish chef’s 
dishes. Not surprisingly, this protective mean turns off the appliance too often than desired during operations. 
Despite being quite inexperienced, the assistant has discovered the possibility to by-pass the switch. The assis-
tant, after a while, decides to by-pass the high temperature switch so to avoid further blames of the chef for 
the delay in producing the desired chips. Actually, he/she is persuaded that, adopting this “escamotage”, 
he/she can manage to produce chips in time without impinging on safety. 
 
3.1 Classical ROA vs. IROA 
From column 4 in Fig. 3 it appears quite clear that the human intervention is usually modelled as an operator 
Missing Intervention (MI) on warnings, while the identification of possible causes due to error of commission 
or other human related failures is left to the sensibility of the analyst.  
From a HF perspective this approach is quite reductive and, thus, far from being realistic. Actually, in reality, 
due to the many stimuli received in the working environment, operators intervene on the system any time they 
are prompted to do it either by explicit warnings and alarms or by environmental hints. Even beyond this, they 
intervene both on the system and on the organisational set-up, unless there are suitable barriers, either soft-
ware or hardware, preventing them to do it or helping them not to do it.  
Typical example is that of by-passing the so-called Engineered Safety Features (ESF), in our case the appa-
ratus 4, or ignoring procedures that, quite often, are perceived by operators more as disturb than a support to 
safer performing daily tasks.  
In order for safety analyses to be realistic, credible, and effective, i.e., to be a support or a tool for decision-
making, all these intangible aspects must be properly modelled. And this is what the IROA attempts to do. 
 
3.2 The IROA framework 
Basically, the IROA framework is similar to that of the classic ROA but with some added features that enable 
to accommodating systematically H&OF into the process. As reported in Figure 4, this is achieved with a mi-
nor modification of the flowchart of the classical ROA, and consequently of the frame for the analysis. 
The main frame of the IROA is still made up of 2 blocks. According to the inhibit concept, the former block is 
devoted to the identification of those hazards that drive the system out of control, while the latter is conceived 
to modelling the effectiveness of protective systems. 
Before analysing the chef’s assistant work with the IROA conceptual scheme, it is worth briefly explaining 
where the IROA differs from its predecessor, with reference to the IROA tables in Figure 5. 
  
Fig. 4: IROA flow chart 
  
 
Fig. 5: IROA framework 
 
Block 1 
In order to allow for the human contribution permeating the analysis any time there is, or there should and/or 
could be, an interaction between the technology and/or the organisation and the human, and not only when the 
system fails to control itself, the block 1 was modified. This modification enables to explicitly identifying the 
root causes deriving from a human failure and originating a process deviation (see boxes J & N, Figure 4). 
As anticipated above, the first block, i.e., that grouping column 1 to 3 in Fig. 5, is devoted to the identification 
of those primary events that leads the system out of control. In this part of the analysis even human failures are 
now accounted for in an integrated fashion together with technological ones. In particular, human interven-
tions in this block have to be modelled as pre-initiators of events, meaning those acts which contribute to let 
system’s components to fail or be in an undetected failing state. In the IROA scheme pre-initiating human 
failures are modelled, together with the technological ones, in column 2 with the aim to unveil primary hu-
man-related root causes. 
Essentially, in the classical ROA scheme the technological causes are investigated through the recursive 
mechanism until primary causes are identified. Actually, primary causes correspond to events which are pos-
sible to associate a frequency of occurrence to.  
To keeping consistency throughout the analysis, the same approach must apply even for the identification hu-
man failures, no matter whether they represent pre-initiating or post-initiating human failures. And this is 
what has been done while moulding the IROA process. The interface with the HRA has then been made ex-
plicit and systematically incorporated into the assessment, thus allowing the analyst to identifying the type of 
human failures involved and the associated frequency of occurrence.  
The types of human failures to identify are dependent on the taxonomy adopted, which can follow either an 
“informal” heuristic approach or a more formal and structured cognitive model. The same applies for the 
quantification step, which is strongly dependent on the method used to quantifying the Human Error Probabil-
ities (HEP). Amongst the most advanced second-generation methods, one can find ATHEANA [14], CREAM 
[15], MERMOS [16], and the like.  
The most famous heuristic taxonomy is the one proposed by Swain and Guttmann [17]. According to this tax-
onomy human failures can be subdivided into three main categories, namely, (1) Error of Omission (EOO) – 
acts omitted (not performed), (3) Error of Commission (EOC) – acts performed inadequately; or in the wrong 
sequence; or too early or too late, (3) Extraneous acts – wrong or not required actions performed.  
The second category also includes errors of quality, i.e., those errors characterising a human failure in the 
sense of non-exact achievement of the aimed goal, such as too great or too small an extent or degree. To put it 
differently, they represent an ineffective action. This is why we named the second block of the IROA, the one 
supposed to stop the process out of control (right harm of the INH gate), ineffective intervention of protective 
means. Certainly, human beings, i.e., operators, can be conceived, despite in a dry definition, protective 
means.  
This simple approach encompasses virtually all kinds of human failures that are likely to occur. It is clearly 
pretty coarse and it does not allow to sharply discriminating amongst many types of failures.  
To make it sharper it can be conveniently coupled with another heuristic taxonomy by Spurgin et al [18], 
which is “context oriented” and involves the following categories:  
 Maintenance-testing failures by which operators fail to restore system’s components and affecting the 
system availability, i.e., latent failures (what we called pre-initiating human failures); 
 Triggering failures by which operators can initiate an event/accident sequence; 
 Recovery failures by which operators fail to recover from a system upset/deviation;  
 Misdiagnosis failures by which operators can prolong, intensify or aggravate the scenario dynamics;  
 Restoring failures by which operators fail to restore apparatus initially unavailable to the system. 
Typically, for sake of simplicity, in this sample use case pre-initiator human interventions will be of the kind 
of missing or erroneous intervention during maintenance, inspection, repair or modification, i.e., those creat-
ing latencies in the system. 
Block 2 
Block 2, instead, is devised to identifying and accommodating post-initiator human interventions, i.e., those 
human actions which contribute either to prevent the dangerous transient to further proceed to Top Event (TE) 
or to worsen it by accelerating its occurrence (co-causes).  
Considering the innate flexibility humans hold, they should be involved, i.e., modelled in the analyses, in a 
way that depicts more convincingly the natural interaction between them and the system. In reality, operators 
go hand in hand with the process scrutinizing its behaviour often applying, more or less consciously, a symp-
toms-based approach.  
This approach, even if quick and effective for most of the cases, lacks of far-seeing and can be responsible of 
rash judgments which, in turn, can lead to human failures. This latency of humans to promptly, for not saying 
impulsively, react on weak signals should, too, find its place in the analysis.  
In line with the ROA paradigm, the top event occurs if, and only if, there is a missing intervention of protec-
tive means. 
Quite similarly, in the IROA scheme the top event occurs if, and only if, there is an ineffective intervention of 
protective means. This slightly different definition allows for the accounting of the dynamic process of recov-
ery in which the human intervention plays a key role. Actually, moving from the concept of missing to that of 
ineffective intervention lets the imagination of the analyst picturing more realistically the evolution of the 
dangerous transient taking place; a dynamism in which many human corrective actions are performed before 
the top event occurs. Even further on this, the IROA framework models the actual interactions between the 
human beings and the technological system in place.  
Again, the ROA procedure has been modified in order of explicitly modelling the human behaviour (see P, Q  
and R boxes in Figure 4). The ROA framework has been modified accordingly by expanding the “missing in-
tervention of protective means” from two columns to six, in order to make it possible to correctly describe the 
“ineffective intervention of protective means” (Figure 5).  
What will be called the left hand of block 2, i.e., that grouping column 4 to 5 and reflecting what is called 
human-technology system failure, is devised to bridle the behaviour of the human-technology system, meant 
as an optimally integrated one. This means that the two controllers, namely the automatic controlling system 
in place and the human one, do not “disturb” each other when performing their respective duties; there is a 
symbiosis between the two.  
In this optimal system, where design features perfectly reflects usability concepts, operators do not have to 
struggle for taking the automatic control system under control so to avoid its excessive or modest intervention. 
Instead, there is a real interpenetration and collaboration between the technology and humans that makes the 
system much safer. The failure occurs actually only when the intervention of both the Automatic Protective 
Means (APM) and the Humans fail.  
Unfortunately, optimal systems are more dreamy than real. In reality, it is easier to find a control system that 
come too often/seldom into action forcing operators to be particularly attentive and awake so as to prevent ei-
ther too many shut downs, with a consequent loss of production, or too many ineffective automatic adjust-
ments that lead to products out of specification.  
Very often, because of this sometime profound incompatibility, i.e., low technology usability, between the 
system and the operators controlling and using it, operators intervene on the control system by-passing the so-
called Engineered Safety Features (EFS). Indeed, once this step is done the reliability of the system can dra-
matically drops down as it goes on “manual mode”, and the entire control activity is up to operators’ capabil-
ity to cope with system behaviour.  
This last step is the one not very much modelled by any safety analysis practice since thought to be either 
something to relegate to malicious actions and, as such, not to model, or, even worse, something avoidable by 
putting in place more barriers or pushing further the automation.  
As the old Latin adage says “in media stat virtus”. In practice, what happens is that the two systems can alter-
nate each other according to the task to perform. In fact, operators, once they got used to a new system, know 
very well its limitations and act accordingly by limiting its intervention (by-pass), i.e., substituting it with their 
corrective actions, or, where allowed, complementing its limited activity with their flexibility and experience, 
thus making the system effective. The same concept applies for the use of the organisational set-up. Very of-
ten operators find more useful to go for short-cuts by-passing organisational procedures.  
It has to be noted that a recent work from Fadier et al. [19] has shown that in case of poor technology, these 
inappropriate actions of the operators, instead of reducing the plant reliability and safety, can improve it. 
 
This discrepancy between design intentions and actual use of productive system by human beings, create a 
grey zone that needs to be modelled if realistic pictures on safety levels are searched for.  
In the IROA methodological frame the trade-off between an optimal human-technology system and a bad one 
is modelled by attributing the ineffective intervention of protective means to the following two main causes:  
 Missing intervention of protective means, and; 
 Human Failure. 
The right hand of block 2, i.e., that grouping column 6 to 9, has been conceived exactly for modelling the by-
pass of ESF.  
As said above, when an operator by-passes the ESF the system switches from automated to fully manual be-
coming extremely vulnerable since dependent only on human capabilities to recover from the unstable transi-
ent.  
In the IROA frame, this is modelled in column 6. Essentially, despite the potential physical behaviour of a 
system is the same regardless to the APM in place, the effects of corrective actions can have an impact on the 
course of the event. Thus, the effects of human interventions on system behaviour must be modelled to check 
whether their impact change the transient sequence. Actually, if the consequences are different from those of 
column 3, after an erroneous intervention of the operator, the new sequence generated by the human interven-
tion has to be addressed in column 7 as a normal consequence of the system. In practice, this is to say that if 
the APM are not in place bounding the system’s behaviour, the human interventions can change the system 
behaviour in a way difficult to predict. And this is especially true in high-technology, high-complex and tight-
coupled systems where the effects of human interventions can be differed in time and space. 
Conventionally, the human intervention at this stage will provoke either the same consequence identified in 
column 3 – no divergence and then the analysis goes on “normally”, or a worsening effect, thus forcing the 
analyst to take this newly generated consequence as the one to further analyse in column 1, i.e., a new devia-
tion to bring down. This can clearly be the immediate subsequent more severe consequence of the previous 
deviation or a brand new one.  
In the IROA concept, the human failure to recover has to be taken into account in two different cases: 
 if the alarm system fails or the operator fails to “detect” it or another form of indication (misreading, 
misjudging, etc.), as in the traditional ROA; 
 if the plant is left without ESF, due to their by-passing; 
In both cases, a missing or ineffective intervention of Erroneous Intervention of Protective Means (EIPM) can 
be considered, and if its missing or ineffective intervention occurs, it will bring up directly to the ineffective 
intervention of protective means, i.e., fail to stop the wrong action.  
Conceptually, there are two types of protective means. The former are those that intervene automatically to 
prevent technological or human failures to occur, while the latter are those coming into action to stop the ef-
fects of a human intervention already performed. The distinction between the two types can be made clearer 
with a simple example.  
When using a word processor it often happen to loose the work due to an erroneous switch off of the program 
without saving. To avoid totally or partially this situation, the program can save automatically every while ac-
cording to customer settings, or stop the effect of the action of the user, when he has already send the “quit” 
command, advising him and waiting for his decision about saving or not.  
The automatic save of the work by the program is clearly the APM. On the contrary, the function stopping the 
effect of the wrong operator action, which has already been performed, falls into the EIPM concept. Thus the 
two are conceptually different as from a human failure standpoint the APM is a preventive means while the 
EIPM is a protective one.  
 
3.3 The chef’s assistant 
The IROA for the chef’s example is that of Fig. 6, built following the flow chart in Fig. 4.  
 
 
Row 1 
When high temperature is reached in the deep-fryer, a traditional ROA would assume the operator not to 
intervene on the system at this stage as considering it perfectly working.  
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Fig. 6: IROA for the frying operation 
 
This means the system, whether left alone controlling itself, would perfectly works producing the desired 
products within the minimum time; in this case crispy and dry chips. In Fig. 6 this would be modelled simply 
by reporting in column 4 only the Missing Intervention of High Temperature Switch protective means. The 
failure of the switch would permit the system to go on towards the TE by further increasing the oil tempera-
ture. Despite being within the optimality as the human contribution perfectly integrates the technological one, 
this way of modelling does not depict the reality. 
It is quite unrealistic to think that, in a situation where the switch does not open and the LED still keeps flash-
ing, the operator, whether detecting the flashing LED, does not intervene manually either by putting off the 
power or by making the necessary control actions. 
Or, at least, he/she does not check what is going on especially whether there is a symbiosis, i.e., a good inter-
action, between the technological and the human controllers. Thus, from a reliability standpoint, this integrat-
ed system can keep going on its degrading way even if the human protective means fails. And this can hap-
pens, column 5, either if the high temperature LED is faulty or the operator does not detect it when working. 
These two added “features” make the system more realistic and much safer since, despite it is true that hu-
mans can intervene erroneously on the system it is even true that they can even save a critical circumstance 
thanks to their experience, flexibility and quickness in adapting to it. 
Up to this point, this new way of proceeding should not overturn the current way of modelling scenarios. 
What sensibly change the situation are columns 6 to 8 as they unveil the potential incompatibility between the 
human and the technological controllers. The high temperature protective mean does not work optimally as it 
switches the deep-fryer too often forcing the assistant to slowing down chef’s work. The assistant is then, say, 
under two fires, namely (1) the blames of the chef and (2) the multiple “quenching” of the APM. To overcome 
the uncomfortable situation the assistant is “pushed” to by-pass the ESF, here the high temperature switch, to 
get the production done in time, i.e., the one imposed by the manager, which in turn is imposed by customers.  
Column 6 tries to shape exactly this situation. After by-passing the high temperature the safety of the pro-
ductive system is exclusively under operator’s control. As such, it has no sense to speculate about the reliabil-
ity and availability of APMs as they are off, i.e., practically inexistent. This is reflected in the reliability of the 
protective system that for this last part of the second block is simply given by the possibility that either the op-
erator misdiagnose the situation, e.g., he/she does not correctly intervene because he/she does not know what 
the flashing LED means, or he/she does not detect it (to be detailed in the logic tree). 
As taken it for granted in the above description, it is worth noticing that while there is a missing interven-
tion of APM, such as the high temperature switch for the case of row 1 here analysed, it has to be investigated 
whether this occurrence can be traceable back to human pre-initiator causes, i.e., those analysed in block 1. 
Put it differently, once a protective means is identified in column 5, its potential latencies built-in by errone-
ous or missing (human) interventions have to be addressed.  
Furthermore, at this time of the accidental sequence what it is interesting to model is, once more, the by-pass 
of ESF. For this case, the maintenance operator needs to by-pass the high temperature switch and, what is 
more important, forget to put it back into service once completed the work.  
Even worse, the system was deliberately put off because of previous false alarms. Unfortunately this approach 
impinges on the safety level, leaving a substantial hole in the protective system as during emergency not eve-
rything goes smoothly and as expected and restoring further barriers can be problematic. This is especially 
true in high-technology, high-complex and tight-coupled systems.  
Column 7 represents the possibility for the operator, once the APM is by-passed, to making an erroneous in-
tervention on an on-site warning or indication. 
The need for, and consequently the lack of, protective means devoted to contain the effects of a possible erro-
neous intervention of an operator, is now highlighted in column 8. 
 
 
 
Rows 2 to 5 
These rows contain the substantial novelty in accounting for HF as pre-initiators. Essentially, in the classi-
cal ROA approach, it is simply stated that there is a Missing Intervention of the thermostat (stuck closed). 
From an HF perspective this position is satisfactory only whether the component has just been installed and 
put into service. In other words, it is acceptable if, and only if, the causes of failure are not traceable back to 
erroneous human intervention performed either during maintenance, repair, and modifications or during the 
decision making process. This reflects the reality that humans intervene on the system, through maintenance, 
repair and modifications, to keep it safe throughout its life. And it even reflects the fact that humans do even 
make decisions on how often and if intervening on the system. It is quite well know how often maintenance is 
not regularly performed because of a prior decision on its costs. Thus, in row 3, the thermostat can stuck 
closed even whether upstream there has been an erroneous intervention either during maintenance or inspec-
tion or a decision on maintenance and/or inspection frequency and appropriateness was made.  
Row 6 
Scrutinizing block 2, the operator can not intervene on smell for instance because either he/she does not 
know that specific smell is a sign of dangerousness or because he/she does not detect it due to an annoying flu. 
Alternatively he/she does not detect the smell simply because the extracting unit is particularly efficient and 
strips quickly out smells from the room not allowing reaching the human threshold for perception. 
Row 7 
Same as previously, the assistant can even not intervene on smoke either because the smoke detector is 
faulty, and thus simply not audible, or because, symmetrically to what described in row 5, the smoke of the 
deep-fryer quickly mixes up with that produced in the preparation of other dishes making the two indistin-
guishable, especially under the pressure of the rushing hour of a busy restaurant. Or, as above, “thanks” to the 
efficient extracting unit. 
Here, it is possible to see what the effects of an erroneous intervention of the operator could be. Once the fire 
is on, the assistant may even erroneously intervene on it amplifying its effect, for example, by flinging a tea 
towel on top of it in the attempt to chock it off, this leading to a spreading of the fire. The same TE reached if 
the APM sprinkler does not intervene in case of fire.  
Once all the types of human erroneous or missing intervention has been identified, the merit of their root 
causes is to be discovered applying a Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) method. Misdetection, for instance, 
can be caused either by lack of training, meaning that the operator does not detect a situation because he/she 
does not have the knowledge to do it, or because of internal and/or environmental disturbances, the so-called 
Performance Shaping Factors (PSFs) present in the context where the accidental scenario is developing, and 
that do not allow to properly do it.  
Similarly to the HRA process, once the human primary events have been identified, the search for their 
route causes and the associated probability of occurrence entails the inclusion of the organisational aspects as-
sociated with them. Probably redundant to say, but this is obvious and consistent with the concept that Human 
& Organisational Factors are not only those factors which characterize the interaction between humans and 
the technology they handle but, more broadly, are those which enable to reveal the many interrelations 
amongst humans and the socio-technical context in which humans daily perform their duties.  
In the most advanced HRA methods [14][15][16] this is fully reflected in the framework of the methodolo-
gy, which does not allow to disregard organisational aspects when performing the analysis as they are inte-
grated in the structure and permeate its practical implementation. 
 
4 THE LINK BETWEEN IROA AND LOGIC TREES 
As anticipated in the introduction, one of the main advantages of the recursive approach it that of easing 
the extraction of logic trees once the operability analysis is completed. In this respect, the IROA does not 
make any exception. The most comfortable way to transform the identified safety issues from the IROA struc-
ture to that of Fault Tree is to extract from the IROA table the Incidental Sequence Diagram (ISD) procedure 
[4]. It is the logic diagram, reporting in a graphical way the information collected in the IROA, linked through 
the logic gates inherent in the analysis (as shown in Fig. 3). It differs from a Fault Tree only for the undevel-
oped causes, both technological and human, of the ineffective interventions of protective means, that will be 
included just before its quantification. 
The new paradigm proposed for the IROA, conceptually framed by the two blocks illustrated above, has, 
too, to be reflected in the construction of the logic trees.  
Fig. 7 represents the ISD of IROA here described. Grey boxes represent the interfaces with the HRA. 
This paradigm differs substantially from that one can derive from the ROA depicted in Fig. 1, for two main 
aspects, namely, (1) the simplistic representation of the human being as a machine-like acting entity, and (2) 
the exclusion of erroneous interventions as a complement of those of omission.  
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Fig. 7: IROA Incidental Sequence Diagram 
 
The process branches of the INH gates are directly extracted from block 1 of Fig. 6 simply by following the 
classical ROA procedure. From a HF perspective pre-initiating human failures are represented there.  
The entire lateral branchs of the INH gate represent, instead, the protective system. The sub-branches of 
this protective system respectively result from block 2 of the IROA framework. These branches are clearly 
linked by an OR gate since it is enough that one of the two fails to let the entire protective system failing. 
To obtain from the ISD the Integrated Fault Tree, as in the classical ROA it is necessary to deepen the 
causes of the ineffective intervention of protective means (lateral branches of the INH gates), including the 
possible pre-initiator human failures.  
 
5 CONCLUSIONS 
This paper, providing a framework that enables to integrating H&OF into Operability Analyses in a sys-
tematic manner, contributes making safety analyses more realistic.  
In particular, the IROA concept here described allows for safety analysts to discern between the human 
primary causes which contribute to put latencies into the system’s components, i.e., the so-called pre-initiating 
human failures, and those which can either trigger an accidental sequence or contribute to change the course 
of an ongoing one, i.e., the so-called post-initiating human failures. Furthermore within the two varieties the 
IROA concept should allow analysts to fairly well distinguish between erroneous interventions and missing 
ones.  
Another relevant contribution the IROA offers is given by the possibility both to modelling the by-pass of 
the ESFs and the consequences that an erroneous human intervention can have on the accidental sequence 
once the ESFs in place have been by-passed. This dynamism of the procedure can positively compel the ana-
lyst to improve his/her ability to look beyond the accidental scenarios created by pure technological failures. 
In addition, thanks to the use of the INH gates and its sequentially structured frame, it even allows for better 
modelling of the timings of the potential accidental sequence.  
The IROA structure as presented in the present paper, thanks to its systematic nature, can ease the transla-
tion of its procedure into a fully computerized code.  
Finally, last but not least, thanks to the easiness with which logic trees can be extracted from a completed 
IROA, the present framework provides a feasible way forward to systematically account for H&OF both in a 
qualitative and, potentially, even a quantitative fashion. The paper does not clearly cover the open issue of 
H&OF data elicitation.  
 
NOTATION 
APM Automatic Protective Means  
EIPM Erroneous Intervention of Protective Means 
EOC Errors of Commission 
EOO Error of Omission 
ESF Engineered Safety Features 
HF Human Factors 
HFI Human Failure Identification 
HRA Human Reliability Analysis 
H&OF Human & Operational Failures 
IFT Integrated Fault Trees 
IROA Integrated Recursive Operability Analysis 
ITE Integrated Top Event 
MI Missing Intervention 
ORA Organisational Reliability Assessment 
QRA Quantitative Risk Assessment 
ROA Recursive Operability Analysis 
TE Top Event 
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